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Abstract 
Due to the technological and financial complexity 
and difficulties of smart city initiatives, the local 
governments usually adopt a public-private 
partnership model to govern such projects. This study 
explores the opportunities and challenges of building 
smart cities through the public-private partnership 
(PPP) model. Using an exploratory case study 
methodology, we interviewed participants in building 
smart city initiatives across China to develop a 
theoretical model that captures the essence of such a 
partnership. Case interview data from three major 
cities in China were utilized. We analyzed the data of 
28 interviews with officials and personnel from public, 
private, and hybrid organizations involved in smart 
city projects. Finally, we identified and theoretically 
validated the following research findings: (1) two key 
components of the success of smart city initiatives; (2) 
four key governance structure characteristics of the 
PPP model that enables the smart city success; (3) two 
key considerations for establishing the governance 
structure of a PPP model. The theoretical framework 
we propose herein can be used to understand the 
current status and provide guidance for future smart 
city initiatives. 
 
1. Introduction  
Smart cities are an important IT-enabled innovation 
in the public sector that has attracted increasing 
attention from both industry and academia [15]. Smart 
cities are viewed as a public-private ecosystem with 
participatory governance and an involvement of non-
governmental stakeholders, which fosters the 
sustainable economic growth and life quality 
improvement [3][6]. The definition of smart cities has 
been transformed from technology-oriented to 
governance-oriented [3][6][8][9][15] and increasingly 
more important roles are played by non-governmental 
stakeholders in the smart cities [2]. Thus, the 
assessment frameworks for evaluating the performance 
or success of smart cities have also changed in the 
same way from mainly focusing on the outcome of the 
technological infrastructure to additionally 
emphasizing the roles, benefits, and rights of external 
stakeholders [21][23]. Though these ideas of 
governance-oriented assessment have been proposed to 
be added into the frameworks, such a more integrated 
framework is still conceptual, not further specifying 
the key contents of the two assessment dimensions. 
Generally, the collaboration between the 
government and the external stakeholders in the smart 
cities construction is a type of public-private 
cooperation. The model of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) is commonly used to design, construct, operate, 
finance, and maintain public infrastructure or public 
service under the cooperation of some sort of durability 
between the public and private sectors, in which they 
jointly develop products and services and share risks, 
costs, and resources [10][31]. Actually, the model has 
been widely adopted by traditional e-government 
initiatives, which has brought many benefits to the 
government, such as enhanced partnerships, better risk 
management, improved public facilities and services, 
and clearer government policies [3]. Nevertheless, it 
has also generated problems, including cost overruns, 
unrealistic price and income projections, and legal 
disputes [19]. Compared with the traditional e-
government initiatives that are relatively simple, 
involving with one or several private sectors [17], 
various private sectors participate in the smart city 
initiatives, making them more complicated and 
difficult to implement. Specifically, challenges have 
appeared associated with increasingly obvious and 
important issues of collective competence and conflict 
among partners [29]. Though previous studies on the 
PPPs in the context of e-government provide some 
important references for research on smart cities, there 
is still a need to further explore the governance 
mechanism of PPPs in smart cities, especially the 
design of an effective PPPs governance structure for 
the successful development of smart cities.  
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Despite certain benefits to the public and private 
sectors, challenges and issues in PPPs initiatives still 
exist, which has been evidenced in a number of 
unsuccessful cases [13]. Hence, the public sectors had 
to ultimately shoulder the cost of failure, but not the 
private sectors [19]. Therefore, this study attempts to 
provide a framework by which leaders and directors of 
public sectors can design effective governance 
structures in public-private partnerships to ensure the 
success of smart city initiatives for their operation and 
outcomes. More specifically, we aimed to identify and 
theoretically validate: (1) key components of the 
success of smart city initiatives; (2) key governance 
structure characteristics of the PPP model that enable 
the success of smart cities; (3) key considerations for 
establishing the governance structure of the PPP model. 
Our research questions are as follows: 
RQ 1: How could the outcomes of smart city 
initiatives be evaluated? 
RQ 2: How do governance structure characteristics 
of PPPs enable the smart city success? 
RQ 3: Why does the local government design such 
a governance structure of PPPs? 
To accomplish our research objectives and lay the 
foundation for future research on PPP model in the 
smart city context, we commenced a case study using 
an exploratory multi-case analysis methodology. In the 
following sections, we initially review the existing 
research on smart cities and public-private partnerships. 
Then, we describe the methodology and the research 
design in detail and present the evidence we collected, 
as well as the results of our analyses. 
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Smart cities 
The concept of smart cities was first proposed in 
1994, and since the approval of the Europe 2020 
Strategy by the European Commission in 2010 [22], a 
trend has become increasingly obvious not only in the 
national support on smart cities projects but also in the 
number of publications related to this topic [16]. A 
range of variants in the terms of its definition is a 
frequent occurrence by replacing “smart” with 
alternative adjectives, such as “intelligent”, “digital”, 
or “ubiquitous”. Although the concept of smart cities is 
widely used, there is still a fuzzy and inconsistent 
understanding of its meaning. Therefore, a one-size-
fits-all definition has not yet appeared [2]. 
In essence, two mainstreams in the present 
discussion on the smart city concept can be identified: 
(1) Technology-oriented strategies that focus on 
enhancing added-value services delivery and effective 
resource management for urban administration to 
citizens based on the efficiency and technological 
advancement of urban hard infrastructure (i.e., wireless 
sensor, Internet of Things, cloud computing, and deep 
learning) [35]; (2) governance-oriented strategies that 
target the soft infrastructure and citizens, designing 
conceptual frameworks, models, and methods in terms 
of urban performance, social and human capital, social 
innovation, governance, participation and policy on the 
basis of previous experience and literature on smart 
cities [1][21]. Other classifications used to categorize 
the notion for smart cities are the technology-oriented 
approach vs. the people-oriented approach [1], supply- 
vs. demand-driven approaches [2], and top-down vs. 
bottom-up initiatives [5].  
2.2. Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
The concept of public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
emerged through the inclusion of the private sector in 
financial projects of the public sector [20]. Due to the 
specific forms of PPP projects across different nations, 
various focuses have been placed in defining the PPP 
concept. For example, informal dialogues between 
government officials and local community-based 
organizations are viewed as essential factors for the 
success of PPPs in the UK, contractual arrangement 
and shared resources and risks are proposed to define a 
PPP in the US, and the government of Canada clearly 
emphasizes the importance of the match between 
expertise and public needs [31]. Besides, a definition 
of PPP from the perspective of an institution is 
proposed as “cooperation of some sort of durability 
between public and private sectors in which they 
jointly develop products and services and share risks, 
costs, and resources which are connected with these 
products” [32], which is viewed as a relatively formal 
definition because of the inclusion of three key 
components of PPP: durable cooperation, risk sharing, 
and joint production [10].  
The existing literature related to PPPs is 
fragmented among several diverse research streams, 
including organizational economics, public 
administration, and project management [10]. The 
academic focus has been concentrated mostly on 
economic issues, such as contract incompleteness and 
transaction and agency costs [12], or explored how to 
balance collective and specific interests in PPP through 
political institutions and political incentives [7]. Some 
studies found that PPPs are a fundamentally new 
organizational form [27], and the frictions among the 
partners in this new organizational form may lead to 
vital issues and unintended consequences [11]. 
Therefore, further discussion on the management of 
such structures has been carried out to investigate the 
governance mechanisms in PPPs [24]. However, 
governance issues associated with the PPP project in 
the context of smart cities are often more complicated 
Page 3286
  
compared with the ones in the E-government, which, 
therefore, need to be addressed in further research. 
 
3. Methods  
3.1. Research design and methodology 
Using the inductive approach for theory-building 
[34], in this research, we discuss the findings of a 
multi-case study. Given the limited number of 
investigations on the influence of the governance 
structure of public-private partnerships on the success 
of smart cities projects, the positivist case study 
approach has the potential to generate valuable insights. 
Conducting a case study is especially useful for 
developing theoretical insights when a phenomenon 
has not been well studied, or the research focuses on 
areas in which the current perspectives seem 
inadequate [25].  
Since there are a number of types of public-private 
partnership models [10], and cities also vary in terms 
of population, acreage, region and GDP, it is critical 
that a multi-case design is adopted for such a study to 
achieve a certain degree of generalizability of its 
findings.  
3.2. Case selection  
In this study, we adopted a purposive sampling 
strategy [6] to determine the case cities that span 
different sizes, regions, and PPP model settings, which 
increases generalizability. Based on an annual report 
on smart cities announced by the National 
Development and Reform Commission of China in 
2017, our research team first approached several cities 
from the top 20 ranking list that had won the national 
best smart city case awards to solicit participation. 
Finally, three cities agreed to participate. In this paper, 
we named them SZ, NJ, and YC for anonymity.  
The first city, SZ, is one of the top four first-tier 
cities in China. It is located in the Southern China 
region, which is famous for its high-tech industry and 
rapid economic growth. The second city is NJ, located 
in the East China region, which is one of the 15 sub-
provincial cities in China. NJ is the capital city of JS 
Province, which is in the second place in terms of 
province-level GDP in China in 2017. The third city is 
YC, which is located in an economically 
underdeveloped region in China, the Western China 
region. YC is one of the largest cities in that region, 
while it is also the capital city of NX Province. 
3.3. Site visits and interviews 
Before the actual site visits started, a research 
protocol was developed that specified the ideal profiles 
of organizations and individuals, the interview protocol, 
and the open-ended questions, based on the literature 
and the focal phenomenon of interest. The study 
focused on governance structure characteristics of 
PPPs as a starting point and then investigated the 
antecedents and consequences of these governance 
structure characteristics which could contribute to the 
success of smart city initiatives.  
Three researchers conducted the interviews from 
October to November 2017. One led the discussion and 
pursued the directions proposed by the interviewees, 
whereas the others took notes and asked additional 
questions. Respondents that were representatives of 
different stockholders in each city were interviewed, 
such as city government officials, general contractors, 
and private partners. All interviews lasted 
approximately 45–60 min; the longest interview 
continued for more than two hours. All interviews were 
recorded using a digital recorder and then transcribed 
into manuscripts that were employed for the qualitative 
data analysis. Additional archival data such as 
introductions and reports on the case cities’ smart city 
projects were also collected to minimize the 
retrospective bias. Finally, a total number of 28 
interviews of participants from 12 organizations in 3 
cities were completed in 2017 (Table 1). 
Table 1. Profiles of the interviewees. 
City 
# of 
Interviewees 
Type of 
organization 
Name of 
organization 
Descriptions of 
Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SZ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
City 
Government 
Officials 
SZ Municipal 
Commission of 
Economic and 
Trade and 
Information 
Director of smart SZ 
project (N = 1) 
SZ Municipal E-
government 
Resources Center 
 Director, Associate 
Director, and a 
project manager (N 
= 3) 
Private 
partners 
SZ Audaque Data 
Technology Ltd. 
VP and a project 
manager (N = 2) 
SZ ZHZX 
Information 
Technology Ltd. 
VP, CTO, and 
Marketing Director 
(N = 3) 
 
 
 
 
NJ 
 
 
 
 
8 
City 
Government 
Officials 
NJ Municipal 
Commission of 
Development and 
Reform  
Director and 
Associate Director 
of smart NJ project 
(N = 2) 
General 
Contractor 
NJ information 
Klc Holdings Ltd. 
CEO and CFO (N = 
2) 
 
Private 
partners 
NJ ZJSY 
Information 
Technology Co., 
Ltd. 
VP (N = 1) 
NJ KH Wireless 
Network 
Communication 
Co., Ltd. 
VP and two project 
managers (N = 3) 
 
 
 
 
YC 
 
 
 
 
11 
City 
Government 
Officials 
YC Municipal 
Big Data Service 
and Management 
Bureau 
Director, Associate 
Director and two 
project managers (N 
= 4) 
YC Citizen 
Center 
IT manager and two 
employees (N = 3) 
General 
contractor 
ZTE (YC) 
Intellectual 
Industry Co., Ltd. 
VP and a project 
manager (N = 2) 
Private 
partners 
ZTE (YC) Smart 
City Research 
Institute 
VP and a project 
manager (N = 2) 
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4. Findings  
The theoretical model that was developed based 
on our interviews and qualitative data analysis is 
illustrated in Figure 1. First, we found that the success 
of smart city initiatives is reflected by two key 
components, including data integration-oriented 
performance and citizen service-oriented performance. 
Second, four key governance structure characteristics 
of the PPP model were identified that enabled the 
smart city success, including top-level planning of the 
local government, government-dominant infrastructure 
construction, hybrid organizational platform as a 
general contractor, and deep involvement of a large 
number of private partners. Especially, the top-level 
planning of the local government and hybrid 
organizational platform as a general contractor exerted 
a positive impact on data integration-oriented 
performance, while the government-dominant 
infrastructure construction and the deep involvement of 
multiple private partners positively affected citizen 
service-oriented performance. Finally, drawing on the 
transaction cost theory, we established that the 
concerns of the communication-related and relation-
related cost are two critical considerations for 
establishing the governance structure of a PPP model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model. 
The proposed theoretical model not only reflects 
the key factors that discriminate the success of the 
cases but also joins together several areas of research 
that have been largely unconnected until now. In the 
present study, we have made propositions on these 
relations to better understand the essence of public-
private partnerships in smart city projects. 
4.1. Components of smart cities projects 
success 
All the case cities in our study implemented a 
number of smart city practices (e.g., smart 
transportation, smart community, smart tourism, etc.) 
to a certain success level. This is not a surprise since 
all the case cities included were selected among the top 
20 smart cities in China and expectedly had to achieve 
a higher-level performance of smart city initiatives. 
However, during the interviews and the post-hoc 
review of the transcripts, two key components of the 
success of smart city initiatives were clearly identified, 
including data integration-oriented and citizen service-
oriented performances. These two components reflect 
the two completely different perspectives of the 
outcomes of smart city initiatives. Therefore, cities 
may just achieve a higher-level performance from one 
certain perspective which could not directly transfer 
into the other perspectives. However, some cities may 
be able to achieve a higher-level performance from 
both perspectives. In every city we visited, the 
interviewees largely confirmed the two components 
although some cities performed well based just only on 
one of the two. A summary of the performances of the 
smart cities projects in the case cities is given in Table 
2. 
Table 2. Summary of the performance of the case 
cities in smart city projects. 
City 
Components of smart cities projects success 
Data integration-oriented 
performance 
Citizen service-oriented 
performance 
NJ High High 
SZ Low High 
YC High Low 
4.1.1. Data integration-oriented performance  
Smart city projects encompass various data 
formats using a wide variety of intelligent objects 
embedded throughout the city. However, the vision of 
the smart city is to integrate a large amount of data 
from multiple sources; data integration within a smart 
city is one of the important challenges to be addressed 
[9]. In recent years, several technologies have been 
integrated into smart cities, which reduce the technical 
barriers to addressing data. An analysis of the 
interview transcripts showed that the leaders and 
directors of smart city projects viewed data integration 
as a key measurement of the success of smart cities. 
The Director of NJ Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform had placed a strong focus on 
the importance of data integration in a smart city 
project. According to him, NJ has achieved a high level 
of data integration during the progress of the smart city 
project: 
“As early as the process of planning for smart 
cities, we realized that data integration was the most 
important task. Comparing with other cities, our work 
on government data integration started relatively 
earlier in China.” 
The Director and project manager of YC Municipal 
Big Data Service and Management Bureau also 
expressed a similar view. 
“Although there are ten modules in the smart city 
project of our city, the association among these 
modules is extremely high. Our design of the smart city 
Concerns of 
communication-
related cost
Concerns of 
Relation-related 
cost
Top-level planning of the 
the local government
Hybrid organizational 
platform for continuous 
operation
Government-dominant 
infrastructure construction
Deep involvement of 
numerous private 
enterprises
P7
P8
P9
P10
Data integration-
oriented 
performance
Citizen service-
oriented 
performance
P3
P4
P5
P6
Transaction 
Cost
Governance 
Structure Success of 
Smart Cities
P1
P2
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project is relatively comprehensive with a relatively 
high degree of integration, which actually solves the 
problem of information isolation.” 
In our study, we define data integration-oriented 
performance as the degree about how a large amount of 
data from multiple sources is integrated in smart city 
projects. To summarize, all of the three case cities 
asserted that a high level of data integration was a key 
indicator of smart city success. However, based on the 
statement of different stakeholders of smart city 
initiatives in the three case cities, NJ and YC had 
achieved a higher level of data integration, whereas the 
data integration of SZ was still at a lower level. Thus, 
herein, we propose that: 
Proposition 1: Data integration-oriented 
performance is a key component of the success of 
smart city initiatives. 
4.1.2. Data integration-oriented performance  
The original intention of smart city projects was 
to help the local government better govern the city by 
the operation of abundant IOT equipment. However, 
the ultimate objective of smart city projects is to help 
the government improve their public services and then 
deliver these services to citizens [23]. An analysis of 
the interview transcripts suggested that the leaders and 
directors of smart city projects viewed citizen services 
as a key measurement of smart cities success. 
For example, the Associate Director of NJ 
information Klc Holdings Ltd. stated that citizen 
service was a critical outcome of the smart city project:  
“I think that the most fundamental task (of a smart 
city) is to help our citizens and make the citizens feel 
usefulness. Concerning the smart city project, the 
satisfaction of the citizens is much more important than 
that of government officials. It is true in NJ City at 
least. These local government officials of NJ are 
exceedingly concerned about the evaluation from their 
service recipients (citizens).” 
According to the evidence in our case interviews, 
SZ City has achieved a relatively higher level of citizen 
service-oriented performance in smart city projects. As 
the Director of the smart SZ project in the SZ 
Municipal Commission of Economic and Trade and 
Information noted: 
“Smart cities should be constructed from the 
perspective of the citizens…The service objects of 
smart cities are the citizens. This must be clearly 
recognized. That is why the citizens’ satisfaction from 
the smart SZ project is high. All applications are 
convenient to use by the citizens.” 
To summarize, a high level of citizen service was 
confirmed as a key indicator of smart city project 
success in all three case cities. However, compared to 
the cities achieving a higher level of citizen service, 
citizen service-oriented performance in YC was still at 
a lower level. In our study, we define citizen service-
oriented performance as the degree about how much 
the value of smart city applications could be perceived 
by the citizens. Thus, we propose that: 
Proposition 2: Citizen service-oriented 
performance is a key component of the success of 
smart city initiatives. 
4.2. Characteristics of the critical governance 
structure of the PPP model implemented and 
its impact on the smart city success  
After we found two key components of the success 
of smart city initiatives, some interesting questions 
should follow: “Why did a city reach a higher level of 
one component but a lower level of another other?” 
and “Why was a city successful from the perspectives 
of the two components?” We may additionally ask 
“What are the differences on the governance structures 
of PPPs among these cities with different outcomes of 
smart city initiatives?” A cross-case analysis of the 
interview transcripts showed that there were four 
critical governance structure characteristics of the PPP 
model that drove cities towards higher levels of smart 
city success. The cross-case comparative evidence on 
how governance structure characteristics of PPPs 
enable the smart city success is displayed in Table 3.  
Table 3. Summary of the relationships between the 
characteristics of the governance structure of the 
PPP model and smart city success 
City 
Key governance structure characteristics of PPP 
model 
Key components of 
smart city success 
 
top-level 
planning 
of the 
local 
governm
ent 
hybrid 
organizatio
nal 
platform as 
a general 
contractor  
governme
nt-
dominant 
infrastruct
ure 
constructi
on 
deep 
involve
ment of 
numerou
s private 
partners 
data 
integrati
on-
oriented 
perform
ance 
citizen 
service-
oriented 
perform
ance 
NJ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ High High 
SZ × × ✓ ✓ Low High 
YC ✓ ✓ × × High Low 
4.2.1. Top-level planning of the local government  
The capability of top-level planning is critical to 
the organizations which attempt to implement 
information systems [29]. The logic is similar for the 
cities in which the construction of smart cities is 
underway. The local government needs to define a 
long-term plan of smart cities since it plays a general 
leadership role in the smart city project. A top-level 
long-term plan of the development of smart cities 
should be designed by considering how to meet the 
requirements of all of governmental departments in the 
local government and how to integrate these various 
requirements. Furthermore, there should be a specific 
department in the local government assigned and 
empowered to be a lead organization to work out and 
implement the top-level plan of the smart city.  
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The Director of NJ Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform confirmed that they were 
playing the general leadership role in the smart NJ 
project. Furthermore, he expressed the notion that the 
top-level plan is a critical enabler of the success of the 
smart NJ project. 
“At the beginning of the smart city project, we set 
up two fundamental rules. The first one was that the NJ 
Municipal Commission of Development and Reform 
should be responsible for top-level planning and 
coordination. Moreover, the second one is that private 
capital that should play an important role…I think the 
reason of our success is that we have had a clear 
strategic plan with a top-level design.” 
In this study, we define top-level planning of the 
local government as a long-term plan of smart cities 
project should be designed at top-level by a lead 
governmental organization. According to our cross-
case analysis based on interview evidence, NJ and YC 
highlighted the importance of the top-level planning of 
the local government in smart city projects. Both cities 
had set up an institutional guarantee to facilitate such a 
top-level planning and ensure the leadership position of 
the local government. The local government of NJ 
assigned a specific department, NJ Municipal 
Commission of Development and Reform, as a lead 
organization to be responsible for the planning and 
managing of the smart city project, while the local 
government of YC founded a new department, named 
YC Municipal Big Data Service and Management 
Bureau, to be the lead organization of the smart YC 
project. However, SZ failed to select the lead 
organization so that there was a lack of top-level 
planning of the smart SZ project. On the contrary, each 
governmental department developed its own plan about 
the smart city according to its own requirements only. 
This scheme gradually caused considerable difficulties 
for the local government of SZ to integrate various 
smart city applications from different fields. As a result, 
the data integration-oriented performance of the smart 
city project was at a relatively higher level in NJ and 
YC, but it was still at a lower level in SZ. A clear top-
level designed plan could provide an integrative vision 
and a consistent standard for all governmental 
departments to develop their smart city applications, 
which will eventually facilitate the data integration, 
which is a fundamental component of the smart city 
success. Thus, we suggest: 
Proposition 3: Cities with a top-level planning 
are more likely to achieve a high-level data 
integration-oriented performance in a smart city 
project. 
4.2.2. Hybrid organizational platform as a general 
contractor  
Public-private partnerships require a hybrid 
collaboration which could coordinate and align 
performance across public and private partners [4]. In 
the context of smart city projects, such hybrid 
collaboration is even more important due to the 
complexity in governance. Some studies highlighted 
the central role of the hybrid organizations in public-
private partnerships [14][30]. According to [33], 
hybrid organizations played an intermediate role to 
reduce the transaction cost between public and private 
sectors. In our study, the case evidence suggested that a 
hybrid organizational platform was a critical 
governance structure characteristic of the PPP model 
which could enable the smart city success especially 
from the perspective of data integration-oriented 
performance. 
The Director of YC Municipal Big Data Service 
and Management Bureau confirmed that the local 
government of YC founded a hybrid organization as a 
platform to participate in calls for bids in the smart YC 
project. 
“For the implementation of smart city projects, we 
(the municipal government) established a joint venture 
company named ZTE (YC) Intellectual Industry Co., 
Ltd., in which investments were made by the municipal 
government and ZTE Communication Company. In fact, 
this company plays a general contractor role in the 
smart city project. We realize the top-level planning 
and design of the smart city project first. After that, 
ZTE (YC) Intellectual Industry Co., Ltd. is responsible 
for calling for bids. Because the stock right of this 
company is held by both the government and ZTE, they 
are strategic cooperation partners.” 
In this research, we define hybrid organizational 
platform as a general contractor as a hybrid 
organizational platform should be founded and 
assigned as a general contractor of the smart city 
project. According to the results of our cross-case 
analysis based on interview evidence, the critical role 
of the hybrid organizational platform as a general 
contractor in smart city projects has been highlighted 
in both NJ and YC projects A new company was set up 
in the two cities according to the hybrid organizational 
form to facilitate the collaboration between public and 
private sectors. Therefore, in NJ and YC, the top-level 
planning of the local government could be more easily 
understood and implemented by private companies 
with the hybrid organizational platforms serving as a 
broker [29]. As a result, the data integration-oriented 
performance of smart city project was at a relatively 
higher level in NJ and YC, whereas it was still at a 
lower level in SZ, where no such a hybrid organization 
acting as a general contractor was available. Thus, we 
propose the following: 
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Proposition 4: Cities with a hybrid 
organizational platform as a general contractor are 
more likely to achieve a high-level data integration-
oriented performance in smart city projects. 
4.2.3. Government-dominant infrastructure 
construction  
Infrastructure construction is the primary task at 
the initial stage of smart city projects. The public smart 
city platform and application systems could be 
constructed based on the existing public infrastructure. 
As a subsequent stage of the smart city project, the 
application systems for smart cities should be private-
dominant and developed based on the PPPs model 
since private companies use more advanced 
technologies and customer services than the 
governmental ones. However, there are two major 
categories for infrastructure construction serving as a 
foundation of smart cities: government-dominant and 
private-dominant. The results of our case interviews 
revealed that NJ and SZ adopted government-dominant 
infrastructure construction, whereas a private-dominant 
infrastructure construction was used in YC. 
The Associate Director of SZ Municipal E-
government Resources Center confirmed that the 
infrastructures of the smart SZ projects implemented 
were fully funded by the SZ government.  
“All of the smart SZ projects openly invited bids 
according to a standard procedure. The eligible 
companies were welcome to participate in the bidding, 
and each company had a fair opportunity to win the 
bidding as long as it qualified. The SZ government 
fully provided the investment for the infrastructure 
construction of the smart city without joint venture or 
any other financial support from private capital.” 
In our study, we define government-dominant 
infrastructure construction as the infrastructures of the 
smart city should be mainly invested and owned by the 
local government. According to our cross-case analysis 
based on interview evidence, shown in Table 3, both 
NJ and SZ adopted government-dominant 
infrastructure construction, and the citizen service-
oriented performance of smart city project was at a 
relatively higher level in NJ and SZ. On the contrary, 
private-dominant infrastructure construction was 
utilized in YC, and its citizen service-oriented 
performance of the smart city project was at a 
relatively lower level. We speculate that if the local 
government had invested and owned the infrastructure, 
then it would have been much easier for the 
government to select some good-quality private 
companies to provide smart city application services to 
the citizens. However, if the local government had lost 
the control power of the smart city infrastructure, then 
the quality of the citizen services could not have been 
guaranteed without the general control of the local 
government. Thus, we suggest the following: 
Proposition 5: Cities with government-dominant 
infrastructure construction are more likely to 
achieve a high-level citizen service-oriented 
performance in smart city projects. 
4.2.4. Deep involvement of numerous private 
partners  
It is critical to adopt a network constitution 
strategy to improve the outcome of PPPs by 
introducing alternatives to facilitate the search for 
quality [18]. As new institutional arrangements to 
provide services for their citizens, the government 
should involve numerous private partners to keep 
alternatives available in public-private partnerships. 
Therefore, we considered that the involvement of a 
great number of private partners was another critical 
governance structure characteristic of PPPs. 
In our case interview, the CEO of NJ information 
Klc Holdings Ltd. confirmed our viewpoint by sharing 
how they attracted more technology-leading private 
partners. 
“The roles of private capitals in our platform are 
two-fold. First, they have very strong research and 
development capabilities. Second, they have a 
relatively strong capacity to expand their resources. 
Therefore, our company's objective is to attract more 
private capitals to be involved in the smart city project 
to play their important roles.” 
In our study, we define deep involvement of 
numerous private partners as the local government 
should attract numerous private partners get involved 
in the smart city project. According to the findings of 
our cross-case analysis based on interview evidence, 
both NJ and SZ attracted numerous private partners to 
become involved in the smart city project, which 
contributed to achieving relatively higher levels of 
their citizen service-oriented performances of the smart 
city projects. In contrast, only one private partner 
participated in the smart YC project, and, accordingly, 
its citizen service-oriented performance was at a 
relatively lower level. We noted that the large number 
of private partners involved allowed for a positive 
competition, which subsequently guaranteed the high 
quality of citizen services provided by the private 
partners. Thus, we propose the following: 
Proposition 6: Cities with deep involvement of 
numerous private partners are more likely to 
achieve a high-level citizen service-oriented 
performance in smart city projects. 
4.3. Antecedents of governance structure 
characteristics of PPP model: a transaction 
cost view 
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After we identified four critical governance 
structure characteristics of the PPP model that drove 
cities towards higher levels of smart city success, 
another interesting and important question followed: 
“Why does the local government design such a 
governance structure of PPPs?” Based on a cross-case 
analysis of the interview transcripts, two constructs 
from the viewpoint of transaction cost economics (TCE) 
were established, communication-related and relation-
related costs.  
4.3.1. Communication-related cost  
Due to the natural gap between public and private 
sectors, their effective communication and mutual 
understanding is a critical issue in the public-private 
partnerships model [28]. According to our cross-case 
analysis of the interview transcripts, the concerns about 
the communication-related cost were identified as an 
antecedent of the design of the governance structure of 
PPPs.  In our study, we define communication-related 
cost as the cost caused by ineffective communication 
and misunderstanding between public and private 
sectors. 
When explaining why top-level planning is critical 
in PPPs, the IT manager of YC Citizen Center 
mentioned the concerns about the communication-
related cost. 
“In the smart YC project, the misunderstanding 
between our governmental departments and ZTE is 
always significant. It takes a long time for us to 
understand each other's thoughts. If we fail to propose 
a long-term strategic plan, the time we waste in 
communication will be even longer.” 
When explaining why they put a lot of efforts in 
designing a top-level planning, the Director of NJ 
Municipal Commission of Development and Reform 
expressed a similar view that a clear top-level planning 
could significantly reduce the communication-related 
cost in public-private partnerships. Thus, we suggest 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 7: Cities with higher concerns about 
the communication-related cost are more likely to 
perform top-level planning in smart city projects. 
When asked why they founded a hybrid 
organization as a general contractor of the smart NJ 
project, the Director of NJ Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform explained the reason. 
“The hybrid organization can efficiently 
communicate with the government because there is 
public capital in the company, whereas it is probably 
inefficient for the pure private enterprise as it needs to 
spend a longer period of time and higher costs to 
understand the idea of the government.” 
Our case interview evidence clearly suggested that 
the concerns about the communication-related cost 
might cause the government design a hybrid 
organizational platform to facilitate the communication 
between public and private sectors. Our finding is 
consistent with the studies note the importance of the 
brokers in the PPP projects [29]. Thus, we suggest the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 8: Cities with higher concerns about 
the communication-related cost are more likely to 
design a hybrid organizational platform as the 
general contractor in smart city projects. 
4.3.2. Relation-related cost  
Public-private partnerships are often difficult to 
organize because of disparate goals, incentives, and 
management practices. Relational coordination reflects 
how the coordination of these social and work 
relationships is viewed as a critical factor affecting task 
performance and the creation of social value in public-
private collaborations [4]. However, in our study, the 
cross-case analysis of the interview transcripts 
suggested that the extra dependence between the public 
and private sectors might lead to a negative outcome. If 
there are too many financial interests among different, 
the outcome of a project is rather difficult to control. 
We found that the local government usually considered 
avoiding the extra-dependent relationship between 
public and private sectors when designing the 
governance structure of PPPs in smart city projects. 
We named this consideration a relation-related cost.  
The Director of SZ Municipal Commission of 
Economic and Trade and Information expressed his 
concerns about the extra-dependent relationships 
between public and private sectors. 
“SZ government has sufficient funding to invest 
into the infrastructure construction of smart city 
projects. We don’t need the private companies get 
involved into the infrastructure construction. 
Otherwise, we will lose the control of the smart city 
projects.” 
Thus, we suggest the following proposition: 
Proposition 9: Cities with higher concerns about 
relation-related cost are more likely to adopt a 
government-dominant infrastructure construction 
in smart city projects. 
When explaining why the involvement of numerous 
of private partners is critical in PPPs, the Director of 
SZ Municipal Commission of Economic and Trade and 
Information mentioned their concerns about the 
relation-related cost. 
“We need to attract more and more private 
companies to join the smart SZ project. The more 
private partners we have, the more confident we are. 
Suppose if we have only one private partner, 
regardless of how bad the performance is, we have to 
accept it. However, if we have a great number of 
partners, we could easily stop the collaboration with 
the partner performing poorly.” 
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Thus, we suggest the following proposition: 
Proposition 10: Cities with higher concerns 
about relation-related cost are more likely to 
involve numerous private partners in smart city 
projects. 
5. Discussion 
5.1. Theoretical Contributions 
From the perspective of theory development, this 
study is among the first of the studies on evaluating 
smart city initiatives from a governance perspective, 
instead of from the technological perspective as has 
been done and described in the existing literature until 
now [6][8]. Since the definition of smart cities has 
been transformed from technology-oriented to 
governance-oriented [3][6][8][9], it is critical to 
transform the assessment frameworks for evaluating 
the performance or success of smart cities in the same 
way [21][23]. Our findings on the two key components 
of the success of smart city initiatives provide a solid 
theoretical foundation for developing a governance-
oriented assessment framework. 
Second, the importance of the governance structure 
of PPPs has been rarely focused on in the existing 
studies [18] [28]. Hence, this study examines its effect 
and extends the extant literature by identifying certain 
key governance structure characteristics based on the 
cross-case evidence obtained. By comparing the case 
interview data from 3 case cities, our research findings 
show how the governance structure characteristics of 
PPPs enable the smart city success. Therefore, this 
study is among the first of the studies on specifying the 
key governance structure characteristics of PPPs and 
their relationships with success of smart cities. 
Third, our study not only reflects the key factors 
that discriminate the success of the cases but also joins 
together several theories that have been largely 
unconnected. For example, drawing on the transaction 
cost theory, this research identifies two new constructs 
related to the transaction cost, concerns about the 
communication-related and relation-related costs, to 
explain the considerations for establishing the 
governance structure of the PPP model. Furthermore, 
based on our case evidence, we propose the specific 
relationships between transaction cost and governance 
structure of the PPPs. This study extends the existing 
literature about transaction cost in PPPs from the 
perspective of economics to organization science. 
5.2. Practical implications 
From a managerial perspective, this study offers 
some prescriptive guidance for understanding the 
currently ongoing and guide future smart city 
initiatives. The theoretical framework we propose 
clearly show the path to smart cities projects success. 
Drawing on our theoretical framework, we could 
provide some suggestions for the cities where the smart 
city projects have great potentials for making further 
progress, such as SZ and YC. On one hand, because 
the data integration-oriented performance of smart SZ 
project is still weak, we suggest the SZ government 
select or found a governmental organization which is 
responsible for top-level planning of the smart SZ 
project. Moreover, a hybrid organizational platform 
should be founded and assigned as a general contractor 
of the smart SZ project. On the other, since the citizen 
service-oriented performance of smart YC project is 
still at a lower level, we suggest the YC government 
reconsider their relation with ZTE. In order to break 
monopoly and introduce competition, the YC 
government needs to attract more private partners get 
involved in the smart YC project. 
6. Conclusion 
The multi-case analysis integrates several literature 
streams to develop a theoretical framework that helps 
us better understand the governance structure of PPPs 
in the context of a smart city. The case data facilitates 
the identification of the concepts in different literature 
streams and connect them. Our research findings are 
threefold. First, we found that data integration-oriented 
and citizen service-oriented performances are two key 
components of the success of smart city initiatives. 
Second, we discovered that four key governance 
structure characteristics of PPP models enable the 
success of smart city programs: top-level planning by 
the local government, government-dominant 
infrastructure construction, hybrid organizational 
platform as a general contractor, and deep involvement 
of numerous private partners. Especially, the top-level 
planning by the local government and the use of a 
hybrid organizational platform as a general contractor 
exert a positive impact on data integration-oriented 
performance. Furthermore, the government-dominant 
infrastructure construction and deep involvement of 
numerous private partners positively affect citizen 
service-oriented performance. Finally, drawing on 
transaction cost theory, we found that the concerns 
about the communication-related and relation-related 
costs are two critical considerations for establishing the 
governance structure of PPP model. 
Similar to most studies, this research is not without 
limitations. The research is based on a purposive 
sample from three cities for the development of 
propositions and a theory for future testing. The 
qualitative research study has only focused on the 
smart city projects in China. Therefore, investigations 
on a wider array of countries would improve the 
generalizability of the results. 
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